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·."'  .--IN  JUST  OVER  A WEEK  FROM  NOWJ 
SEVEN  INDUSTRIALIZED  NATIONS  AND  THE 
EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  - THE  E,C,  - WILL 
BE  MEETING  IN  VERSAILLES  FOR  THE  EIGHTH 
"ECONOMIC"  SUMMIT  OF  INDUSTRIALIZED  NATIONS, 
ONE  OF  THE  MAJOR  ITEMS  ON  THEIR 
-
AGENDA  WILL  BE  THE  VERY  SUBJECT  YOU  HAVE 
-BEEN  DISCUSSING  HERE  AT  THIS  CONFERENCEJ 
PROTECTIONISM, 
THE  NATIONS  THAT  WILL  BE  MEETING 
NEXT  WEEK  ARE  ALL  COMMITTED  TO  RESISTING 
PROTECTIONISM  AND  TO  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF 
FREE  TRADE,  AND  YETJ  PROTECTIONIST  TRENDS 
PERSISTJ  AND  WE  ARE  CONSTANTLY  SPARRING  WITH 
ONE  ANOTHER  OVER  ACTIONS  TAKEN  OR  THREATENED 
TO  BE  TAKEN  BY  OUR  TRADING  PARTNERS  TO 
IMMUNIZE  NATIONAL  ECONOMIES  FROM  THE  VAGARIES 
OF  INTERNATIONAL  TRADING, 
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I.  THE  E.C,  AND  FREE  TRADE: 
THE  PROGRESSIVE  L1BERALIZATION  OF 
TRADE  AND  RESISTANCE  TO  PROTECTIONISM  HAVE 
BEEN  FUNDAMENTAL  OBJECTIVES  OF  THE  WESTERN 
WORLD  SINCE  THE  END  OF  THE  SECOND  WORlDWAR. 
THE  CREATION  OF  SUCH  INTERNATIONAL  INSTITU-
TIONS  AS  THE  GATTi  THE  IMF  AND  THE  OECD 
REFLECTED  THE  CONCERN  OF  THE  INDUSTRIALIZED 
WORLD'S  LEADERSHIP  THAT  THERE  NOT  BE  A-
RETURN  TO  THE  BEGGAR-THY-NEIGHBOR  POLICIES 
OF  THE  1920s  AND  1930s. 
IN  EUROPE,  THE  EUROPEAN  ECONOMIC 
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COMMUNITY  - THE  COMMON  MARKET  - WAS  FORMED,  - ~ 
ABOLISHING  TRADE  BARRIERS  AMONG  THE  MEMBER-
STATES  AND  HARMONIZING  EXTERNAL  TARIFFS. 
COMMITMENT  TO  FREE  TRADE  WAS  A KEY 
ELEMENT  IN  THE  CREATION  AND  DEVELOPMENT  OF 
THE  COMMUNITY  AND  REMAINS  AN  ESSENTIAL 
ELEMENT  OF  EUROPE'S  ECONOMIC  SURVIVAL,  AS 
/THE  E,C,  IS  HIGHLY.,, 
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THE  E.C.  IS  HIGHLY  TRADE-DEPENDENT,  IMPORTS 
AND  EXPORTS  CONSTITUTE  OVER  20%  OF  THE  E.C,'S 
GNP.  THE  CONSOLIDATION  OF  TEN  NATIONAL 
ECONOMIES  HAS  CREATED  THE  WORLD'S  LARGEST 
TRADING  ENTITY.  TOGETHERJ  THE  UNITED  STATES 
AND  THE  E,C,  ACCOUNT  FOR  50%  OF  ALL  WORLD 
TRADE. 
._ .  ~-: -_ : 
.  . ~- ·, 
THE  E,C,  IS  THE  LIVING  EXPRESSION 
OF  EUROPE'S  BELIEF  IN  FREE  TRADE,  THAT 
BELIEF  HAS  NOT  WEAKENED  IN  RECENT  YEARS, 
~~~~-~~~~ 
II.  THE  POST-WAR  INTERNATIONAL  TRADING 
SYSTEM 
IN  THE  195QsJ  AND  PARTICULARLY  IN 
THE  196QsJ  THE  WORLD  MOVED  TOWARDS  FREER 
TRADE  A~D GREATER  PROSPER ITY1  WITH  MANY 
QUOTAS  AND  TARIFFS  SHARPLY  REDUCED  OR  INDEED 
ELIMINATED  UNDER  THE  IMPACT  OF  THE  DILLON 
AND  KENNEDY  ROUNDS  OF  TRADE  NEGOTIATIONS, 
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FURTHER  PROGRESS  WAS  ACHIEVED  DURING  THE 
TOKYO  ROUND  IN  THE  1970s~  WHICH  LED  TO 
- .....  '.  '  .· ·. 
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NEVERTHELESS~  WHILE  FREER  TRADE 
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WAS  HAILED  AS  A NECESSARY  OBJECTIVE  TO 
ENSURE  WORLD  PROSPERITY  AND  ECONOMIC  GROWTH~ 
THE  SPECTER  OF  PROTECTIONISM  NEVER  TOTALLY 
DISAPPEARED,  ~~~ 
IN  THE  EARLY  1970s~  THE  THREEFOLD 
INCREASE  IN  OIL  PRICES  SLOWED  THE  LONG 
POST-WAR  EXPANSION  OF  WORLD  PROSPERITY, 
THE  OIL  CRISIS  EVENTUALLY  IGNITED  A MAJOR 
WORLD  RECESSION  THAT  HAS  NOT  YET  SUBSIDED 
AND  WHICH  SUCCEEDED  IN  CREATING  A FAVORABLE 
ENVIRONMENT  FOR  PROTECTIONISM, 
PROTECTIONISM  BEGAN  TO  RE-EMERGE  AS 
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/A  POLICY  OPTION,,, 
,-,;.  ·.  -·  ·,.,  ..  ....  ~ 
-.' 
•. :·  .  .... _  ,·· ..  ·_·,  . 
.  ;· :·:·-'._::  .  .  '·  ...... - ·  .  .. _-'-·  ...  .. ...  ··.··  . 
.  ·  ...  ;.:·-::_,·_, 
•  •••••  ¥. 
·_.  ·  ..  :·· 
·.·.  ,·  ,,: 
.  . .  . .  . .  '-~-- ~  ' - -------~----------------::-------
5  -t$,;;,;  ;<~ 
A POLICY  OPTION,  IF  NOT  POLICY  INSTRUMENT, 
IN  MANY  NATIONS,  AIMED  AT  ALLEVIATING  THE 
EFFECTS  OF  THE  RISE  IN  ENERGY  COSTS,  IN 
ADDITION,  THE  SLOWDOWN  IN  THE  EXPANSION  OF 
WORLD  TRADE  WHICH  RESULTED  FROM  THE  ECONOMIC 
CONTRACTION  INDUCED  BY  OIL  PRICE  HIKES 
ACCENTUATED  THE  ~MERGING NEW  COMPETITIVE 
BALANCE  AMONG  THE  PARTICIPANTS  IN  INTERNA-
TIONAL  TRADE,  THE  MAJOR  INDUSTRIALIZED 
COUNTRIES  FOUND  THEMSELVES  STRONGLY 
CHALLENGED  BY  NEW  COMPETITORS,  FIRST  IN 
THEIR  HOME  MARKET~AND  SUBSEQUENTLY  IN 
THIRD  MARKETS, 
THUS  PROTECTIONIST  PRESSURES  DE-
VELOPED  IN  SECTORS  SUCH  AS  STEEL,  AUTOMOBILES, 
TELEVISIONS,  SHOES,  TO  CITE  A FEW, 
IN  ADDITION,  IN  THE  LAST  DECADE, 
TRADE  BEGAN  TO  BE  USED  AS  A POLICY  TOOL 
/FOR  ACHIEVING,,, 
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FOR  ACHIEVING  POLITICAL  OBJECTIVES~  (I,E, 
JACKSON-YANIK  AMENDMENT1  OIL  EMBARG01  GRAIN 
EMBARGO). 
AS  WE  MOVE  INTO  THE  1980s~  THESE 
PROTECTIONIST  PRESSURES  REMAIN,  WHILE  THOSE 
PRESSURES  ARE  NOT  NEW1  THEY  ARE  A SOURCE  OF 
CONTINUING  CONCERN  TO  WESTERN  EUROPEAN 
GOVERNMENTS  AND  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY, 
DISTURBINGLY1  ADDITIONAL  PROTECTIONIST 
PRESSURES  ARE  GROWING  IN  THE  COUNTRY  WHICH 
HAS  THE  MOST  TO  GAIN  FROM  THE  MAINTENANCE 
OF  A FREE-TRADE  SYSTEM, 
IN  THE  UNITED  STATES1  THE  ADMINIS-
TRATION  HAS  IMPOSED  QUOTAS  ON  SUGAR  IMPORTS; 
LEGISLATION  SEEKING  RECIPROCITY  ON  A BILATERAL  ; 
OR  SECTORAL  BASIS  HAS  BEEN  INTRODUCED  IN 
CONGRESS;  THE  CONCEPT  OF  MINIMUM  LOCAL 
CONTENT  REQUIREMENTS  IN  AUTOS  IS  ADVOCATED 
~-, ...  ~ .  ' '  '  .... 
..  ·."··-
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BY  THE  UNIONS.  IN  ADDITION1  SEVERAL  STATES  ~~!:~~~~~ 
/HAVE  INTRODUCED ••  I 
·.·.·.·· .  ..· 
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HAVE  INTRODUCED  "BUY  AMERICA"  RULES  FOR 
STATE  PROCUREMENT  CONTRACTS,  PRIVATE 
'' 
COMPANIES  HAVE  INCREASED  RECOURSE  TO  U,S, 
TRADE  LEGISLATION 1  SEEKING  "RELIEF"  FROM 
FOREIGN  COMPETITION. 
III.  WORLD  RECESSION 
THE  DEEPER  AND  LONGER-THAN-EXPECTED 
WORLD  RECESSION  CONTINUES  TO  SHACKLE  DOMESTIC 
ECONOMIES.  HIGH  INTEREST  RATES  AND  LOWER 
LEVELS  OF  DEMAND  HAVE  RESTRICTED  ECONOMIC 
GROWTH  THROUGHOUT  MOST  OF  THE  WORLD. 
FORECASTS  INDICATE  THAT  THE  WESTERN  NATIONS' 
ECONOMIC  GROWTH  RATE  WILL  BE  A MERE  1,5%  IN 
1982 I  IN  1981J  THE  E' c  I  COUNTRIES I  GNP 
DECREASED  IN  REAL  TERMS  BY  NEARLY  1%1  AND 
THE  U.S.  ECONOMY  GREW  BY  LESS  THAN  2%.  UN-
EMPLOYMENT  IS  AT  ITS  HIGHEST  LEVEL  SINCE  1941 
ON  BOTH  SIDES  OF  THE  ATLANTIC, 
/IT  IS  dUITE  CLEAR,  I  I 
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IT  IS  QUITE  CLEAR  THAT  THE  CONTINUING 
WORLD  RECESSION  IS  THE  BACKDROP  AGAINST  WHICH 
CURRENT  PROTECTIONIST  TENDENCIES  SHOULD  BE 
'1.  j 
VIEWED.  IN  TIMES  OF  ECONOMIC  DOWNTURN,  IT 
BECOMES  POLITICALLY  ATTRACTIVE  AND  ECONOMI-
CALLY  EXPEDIENT  TO  USE,  OR  THREATEN  TO  USE 1 
TRADE  RESTRICTIONS  TO  SATISFY  THE  DEMANDS 
_0~ _INDUSTRIAL  AND  AGRICULTURAL  INTERESTS 
AFFECTED  BY  COMPETITION  FROM  FOREIGN 
SUPPLIERS,  OR  BY  THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  MEASURES 
TO  RE-STRUCTURE  AND  STREAMLINE  CERTAIN 
SECTORS  OF  INDUSTRY. 
IV.  NEED  FOR  TRADE 
PERSISTENT  HIGH  UNEMPLOYMENT, 
STAGNATING  INCOMES,  BUDGETARY  CONSTRAINTS, 
REDUCED  PRODUCTION,  AND  INFLATIONARY 
PRESSURES  CREATE  AN  ENVIRONMENT  IN  WHICH 
PROTECTIONIST  PRESSURES  CAN  THRIVE. 
/PARADOXTCALLY.  I  I 
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PARADOXICALLY,  ONLY  TRADE  EXPANSION  RATHER 
THAN  TRADE  RESTRICTION$  CAN  ALLEVIATE  THE 
VERY  ILLS  THAT  PROTECTIONISM  IS  SEEKING  TO 
CURE.  PROTECTION  OF  INTERNAL  MARKETS  IS 
THE  TYPE  OF  MEDICINE  FOR  THE  WORLD'S  ECONOMIC 




MALADY  THAT  MAY  RENDER  THE  PATIENT  EVEN  SICKER,\  '  .  ',  .. 
GROWING  PROTECTIONIST  TRENDS  IMPEDE 
RATHER  THAN  PROMOTE  IMPROVEMENTS  IN  THE 
ECONOMIES  OF  INDUSTRIALIZED  COUNTRIES,  THEY: 
INCREASE  THE  COSTS  OF  PRODUCTIONi 
CREATE  UNEMPLOYMENTi 
PROVIDE  ILLUSORY  BREATHING-SPACE 
TO  INDUSTRIES  IN  NEED  OF  RE-STRUCT~  . 
URINGi 
SPREAD  EASILY  AS  OTHER  COUNTRIES 
SEEK  TO  ADJUST  TO  A REDUCTION  IN 
EXPORT  OPPORTUNITIES  BY  RESERVING 
THEIR  DOMESTIC  MARKETS  FOR  THEIR 
OWN  FIRMS. 
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MOREOVER}  A BASIC  CONDITION  FOR  A  .... ·'  '~  .'~- ·: ,.  . '···· 
GENERALLY  OPEN  TRADING  SYSTEM  IS  AN  EFFECTIVE  · 
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RATE  REGIME  THAN  THAT  PROVIDED  BY  THE  BRETTON 
WOODS  SYSTEM  IS  NECESSARY}  THERE  HAS  BEEN 
MOUNTING  CONCERij  OVER  THE  INSTABILITY  CAUSED 
BY  THE  ACTIONS  OR  - MORE  APPROPRIATELY  - THE 
INACTIONS  OF  SEVERAL  OF  THE  MAJOR  PARTICIPANTS 
IN  THE  SYSTEM  IN  EFFECT  TODAY~ 
v.  MONETARY  POLICY  AND  TRADE 
GIVEN  THE  INCREASING  INTERDEPENDENCE 
OF  WESTERN  ECONOMIES}  AND  THE  STILL-DOMINANT 
ROLE  OF  THE  DOLLAR  IN  INTERNATIONAL  TRANS-
ACTIONS}  THE  FISCAL  AND  MONETARY  POLICIES  OF 
THE  UNITED  STATES  UNQUESTIONABLY  HAVE  A 
DIRECT  IMPACT  ON  EUROPEAN  ECONOMIES,  EUROPEAN  .· 
COUNTRIES  HAVE  BEENJ  AND  ARE  STILL  TODAYJ 
DE  FACTO  PRISONERS  OF  U,S,  MONETARY  AND 
/POLICIES,,, 
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POLICIES,  SINCE  19791  EXCESSIVELY  HIGH  REAL 
INTEREST  RATES  IN  THE  U,S  HAVE  PROVOKED  A 
RENEWED  FLOW  OF  FUNDS  INTO  THE  DOLLAR,  THESE 
RECORD  HIGH  REAL  U.S,  INTEREST  RATES  AND  THE 
RELATED  OVER-VALUATION  OF  THE  DOLLAR 1  WHILE 
''  BENEFITTING  EUROPEAN  EXPORTS  OVER  TIME1 
IMMEDIATELY  DEPRESSED  CAPITAL  INVESTMENT  IN 
_EUROPE/  AND  MADE  THE  RE-STRUCTURING  PROCESS 
MORE  DIFFICULT, 
HIGH  AND  RISING  DOLLAR  INTEREST 
RATES  HAVE  CONFRONTED  EUROPEAN  GOVERNMENTS 
WITH  DIFFICULT  CHOICES  INVOLVING  BUDGETARY 
EXPENDITURES,  THEY  HAVE  HAD  TO  CHOOSE 
BETWEEN  INCREASING  THEIR  DOMESTIC  INTEREST 
RATES  AT  THE  RISK  OF  DEEPENING  THE  RECESSION 
AND  INTERFERING  WITH  WHAT  FEW  SIGNS  THERE 
HAVE  BEEN  OF  ECONOMIC  REVIVAL1  OR  ALLOWING 
A DEPRECIATION  OF  THEIR  CURRENCIES  AT  THE 
RISK  OF  INCREASED  IMPORTED  INFLATION, 
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THE 
SITUATION  HAS  BEEN  SO  SEVERE  THAT  SEVERAL 
PROMINENT  EUROPEAN  FINANCE  MINISTERS  HAVE 
EXPRESSED  THE  DESIRE  FOR  A CONCERTED  EUROPEAN 
INTEREST  RATE  POLICY  TO  COUNTER 1  OR  IN  FACT 1 
INSULATE  EUROPEAN  ECONOMIES  FROM  THAT  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES,  JN  THE  PURSUIT  OF  GREATER 
MONETARY  AUTONOMY1  HOWEVER 1  IT  IS  CLEAR  THAT 
EUROPE  DOES  NOT  POSSESS  THE  CAPABILITY  TO 
WIDEN  ITS  SCOPE  FOR  INDEPENDENT  ACTION 
QUICKLY  AND  EASILY, 
OF  COURSE 1  THE  EFFECT  ON  EUROPE  OF 
AMERICAN  INTEREST  RATE  DEVELOPMENTS  AND 
BUDGETARY  POLICY  IS  ALSO  A REFLECTION  OF  THE 
' 
WEAKNESSES  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  ECONOMIES  THEM-
SELVES,  GROWING  BUDGET  DEFICITS  AND  INFLA-
TIONARY  PRESSURES  WITHIN  EUROPE  ARE  COROLLARY 
FA€TORS  TO  THE  PERSISTENCE  OF  HIGH  INTEREST 
RATES  IN  EUROPE,  NEVERTHELESS 1  IN  LARGE  PART 
BECAUSE  OF  A CONSIDERABLE  HIGHER  EUROPEAN 
.  .  .  ' 
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RATE  OF  SAVINGS  - WHICH  CONTINUES  TODAY  -
EUROPEAN  NATIONS  HAD  NOT  EXPERIENCED  DIFFI-
.I' 
CULTY  IN  FINANCING  THEIR  DEFICITS  BEFORE  U,S, 
RATES  HIT  RECORD  HIGHS  STARTING  IN  1979, 
THIS  IS  NOTEWORTHY  DUE  TO  THE  FACT  THAT 
EUROPEAN  PUBLIC-SECTOR  DEFICITS  MEASURED  AS 
A PERCENTAGE  OF  .GNP  HAVE  TRADITIONALLY  BEEN 
MORE  THAN  DOUBLE  THAT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
-·...  ·. >. ; ..... . 
APART  FROM  CONCERNS  ABOUT  THE  HIGH  ~~~~~~5~~#f4~~¥ 
LEVEL  OF  U.S,  INTEREST  RATESJ  THERE  IS  ALSO 
WIDESPREAD  CONCERN  IN  EUROPE  REGARDING  THE 
VOLATILITY  OF  U,S,  INTEREST  RATES  AND  THE 
EFFECT  THAT  IT  HAS  HAD  IN  RAISING  EXCHANGE-
..  __ ,; 
RATE  VOLATILITY,  THE  EXCHANGE-RATE  VOLATILITY  ..  ·  - · 
THAT  WE  HAVE  RECENTLY  WITNESSED  TENDS  TO 
DISCOURAGE  INVESTMENTJ  IMPEDE  GROWTH,  AND 
REPRESENTS  A SUBSTANTIAL  BARRIER  TO  INTER-
NATIONAL  TRADE,  INDEED,  EXCHANGE-RATE 
VOLATILITY  FORCES  MANAGERS  IN  THE  INVESTMENT 
AND  TRADE  FIELDS  ON  BOTH  SIDES  OF  THE 
/ATLANTIC  TO  ,,, 
.  ,. .  '.·-:  ...  ·· .. · 
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ATLANTIC  TO  CONCENTRATE  MORE  ON  TRYING  TO 
GUESS  EXCHANGE-RATE  MOVEMENTS  RATHER  THAN 
'·  '  ·.· 
,''I  ', 
.  ..  .  . .  .·.  . .  :  .  '. 
ON  IMPROVING  PRODUCTION  PROCESSES1  INVESTING 
.. 
IN  NEW  PRODUCTS1  AND  SEEKING  NEW  MARKETS.  ~~lt~~~~~~i~~~ 
THERE  IS  ALSO  UNIFORM  AGREEMENT  IN 
EUROPEAN  QUARTERS  REGARDING  THE  NEED  FOR  A  · ·.- ·· 
GREATER  EFFORT  TO  STABILIZE  EXCHANGE  RATES1 
IS  NECESSARY  TO  BACK  UP  BETTER-BALANCED 
MONETARY  AND  FISCAL  POLICIES  AIMED  AT 
EXCHANGE-RATE  AVAILABILITY,  A RECENT  PRIVATE 
REPORT  ISSUED  BY  THE  GROUP  OF  THIRTY1  A 
GROUP  OF  INTERNATIONAL  BANKERS  AND  ECONOMISTS 
(WHICH  INCLUDES  SUCH  PEOPLE  AS  JOHANNES 
/WI TTEVEEN  I  I  • 
_,.,:  .. 
,,.  · .. 
.  ·.' .  .,  . 
. ··:.  '  _., ... 
.  ·:  -.· 
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WITTEVEEN_,  ANTHONY  SOLOMON.,  HENRY  WALLICH  ·  :·  , : o:  _ 
CLAUDE  PIERRE-BROSSOLETTE~HAS STATED  THAT 1  AS  ~·'  . '  ;  ' ..  ·.  .  '-•-.•  ;:·,~~~~~ 
A RESULT  OF  EXCHANGE  RATES  GETTING  OUT  OF  ,r;:.  ..  ·. _ ...  ,  __  ._,..,..  .  ···:+ 
L  I N  E WI T  H UNDERLYING  TRENDS  I N COMP ET IT IV ENE S  S  ~f~~j~}f~~~~~~tt~~t/:~:-:\~;~;,(;:~t-}\_i~~}~}.t0J~ 
AND  OTHER  STRUCTURAL  FACTORS.,  "RECENT  SWINGS 
ON  EXCHANGE  MARKETS  ARE  STOKING  UP  THE  FLAMES 
OF  WORLD  PROTECliONISM," 
FIGHTING  INFLATION  IS  A LAUDABLE 
GOAL.,  WHICH  WE  ALL  SHARE,  HOWEVER.,  A CERTAIN 
POLICY  MIX  WHICH  EMPHASIZES  MONETARY  PRUDENCE 
RISKS  CREATING  ECONOMIC  CONDITIONS  THAT  CAN 
BRING  ABOUT  RESTRICTIVE  MEASURES  IN  THE  TRADE 
AREA,  ECONOMIC  GROWTH  WAS  BOTH  THE  CAUSE  AND 
EFFECT  OF  THE  INCREASE  IN  THE  VOUME.,  VARIETY 
AND  VALUE  OF  TRADE  IN  THE  1950s  AND  1960s., 
AND  A PRIME  DETERRENT  TO  TRADE  WARS  AND 
PROTECTIONIST  ACTIONS,  THE  REALITY  IS  NO 
LESS  TRUE  TODAY, 
VI.  OUTLOOK 
:  .. -·  .·  - .... 
- ~- .  ;  ·. 
......  -.... 
....... ;  .J_  ••• ·_,,. 
·-·'  .  . . ..  · 
.  .  ; '· -··: .:  . '. ··.  :. >.  . .; .  .  -·  .  ·  .. ·.· ......  :  ~  . :. .  .., .·  ~- .  __  .. 
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VI. 
PREDICTING  WHAT  THE  FUTURE  WILL  BRING 
FOR  INTERNATIONAL  TRADE  IS  NEVER  EASY.  IF 
WE  LOOK  AT  THE  POST-WAR  PERIODJ  IT  IS  QUITE 
CLEAR  THAT  THE  SO-CALLED  "TRADE  WARS"  WERE 
MERE  SKIRMISHES  AND  NEVER  DETERIORATED  INTO 
FULL-SCALE  CONFLICTS  OR  TO  A DISINTEGRATION 
'  .  .. ..  ~  ~· :  ".,.:  . .  . 
~~ 
-~- .  . .  '  -. '  •  J 
-OF.  -THE  POST-WAR  INTERNATIONAL  TRADING  SYSTEM.  ·· 
THERE  AREJ  HOWEVER  A COUPLE  OF  CURRENT 
DEVELOPMENTS  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  REGARDING 
TRADE  WHICH  ARE  CAUSING  CONCERN  IN  WESTERN 
EUROPE. 
ONE  IS  THE  GROWING  PROCLIVITY  OF 
THE  UNITED  STATES  TO  PUT  THE  BLAME 
FOR  RECENT  DIFFICULTIES  IN  INDUSTRY 
AND  IN  AGRICULTUREJ  ON  THE  EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY.  IN  AGRICULTUREJ 
..  ··_,. 
PARTICULARLYJ  IT  IS  DOWNRIGHT 
ITO  PLACE ••• 
FALSE  ~~~~~&?t~!$~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
-~.  .. . ·.  '.  ·..  ~  ~ 
'  ·~:  : .·  ...  . '. 
"' . 17  ~-.~ 
.  ~  .  . . .  ~  • .. 
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TO  PLACE  THE  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR 
THE  DIFFICULT  SITUATION  OF  THE 
AMERICAN  FARMER  TODAY;  SUCH  AS 
LOWER  PRICES  FOR  CERTAIN  COMMO-
DITIES~  ON  THE  COMMON  AGRICULTURAL 
POLICY, 
-y~~~~~]~~i.~iii~~~i 
FOR  EXAMPLE1  IN  THE  CASE  OF  WHEAT1 
WORLD  PRICES  ARE  DETERMINED  BY  THE 
'' 
SIZE  OF  THE  U.S,  CROP  AND  THE 
;_ . . . .  .  .  ~ .  .  . 
DEMAND  FROM  THE  S  OV I  ET  UN I  0  N  ,  OVER  ~~i~t~ft!i~~i~~~~~~~~ff~~A]i~$:;,;•~7~~~: 
:~<,::.:-; .  ..-:~-··--;.·:·<..;...__·,.  . -·  ..  ,.  ·---~----~. :.- .  ._  .  .  . 
THE  PAST  THREE  YEARS1  THE  .  .a tlS .. · 
CROP  HAS  INCREASED  FROM  58  MILLION 
METRIC  TONS  TO  76  MILLION  METRIC 
TONS,  THE  18  MILLION-TON  INCREASE 
WAS  MORE  THAN  DOUBLE  THE  TOTAL  E.CI 
WHEAT  EXPORTS 1  MEANING  THAT  MARKET 
PRICES  WOULD  HAVE  BEEN  DEPRESSED 
EVEN  IF  THE  E.C.  HAS  NOT  EXPORTED 
I 
WHEAT,  THE  E.C,  REMAINS  THE  WORill
1S 
LARGEST  IMPORTER  OF  AGRICULTURAL 
...  ·.-.  ;. :  .  :~  :-·· .- :·: .. : . . 
GOODS  AND  HAS  A $ 7 BILLION  AGRI- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~J:t~{:t:{~~~ir 
/CULTURAL  TRADE  I  I  I 
·  __ -·-... ,  -·. __ :·_ 
' .. .  _:~-- ; ....  ·.  . . .  .  ~  . 
_:  ... 
. ' .  ~-18  ~~~~ 
.  ~· .. 
CULTURAL  TRADE  DEFICIT  WITH  THE 
UNITED  STATES. 
- A  SECOND  DISTURBING  DEVELOPMENT  IS  i~;~;~rl~~~1r~t~' 
THE  APPARENT  DESIRE  IN  THIS  COUNTRY 
TO  CHALLENGE  INTERNATIONAL  TRADING 
ARRANGEMENTSJ  PAINFULLY  WORKED  OVER 
A GENERATION~  BY  THREATENING  TO 
SEEK  A REVISION  OF  GATT  RULES. 
IN  THE  "FIELD"  OF  AGRICULTURE.  THE 
E.C.  STANDS  ACCUSED  OF  SUBSIDIZING 
ITS  EXPORTS  OF  AGRICULTURAL  COMMO-
DITIES,  THIS  ALLEGEDLY  UNDERCUTS 
U.S.  PRODUCTS  IN  THIRD  MARKETS; 
THEREFOREJ  U.S.  PRODUCERS  CLAIM, 
THEY  MUST  BE  REMOVED.  THE  EXIST-
ENCE  OF  AGRICULTURAL  SUBSIDIES  IS 
PERMITTED  BY  A "CODE"  NEGOTIATED 
AND  AGREED  TO  IN  THE  TOKYO  ROUND  OF 
NEGOTIATIONSJ  WHICH  PERMITS  SUCH 
.  ·  ....  .  ,  .. 
.  .  ·.  '  ~--: 
.... _  ,··  .. 
:.': ... ..  ".'.  '. 
'-:. 
~.; .  .  ~ 
·" 
/suBSIDIES  As  LONG  •• , 
· ...  ' 
.  '  .. 
'· 
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SUBSIDIES  AS  LONG  AS  THEY  DO  NOT 
ENTAIL  THE  ACQUISITION  OF  MORE  THAN 
::  ::~:T::~:E:H::\:: :::~~TRADE.  ~i&Wi{~~~ILi: 
IN  FACTJ  OVER  THE  LAST  DECADEJ  E,C, 
EXPORTS  AS  A PERCENTAGE  OF  WORLD 
AGRICULTURAL  EXPORTS  WENT  FROM  10 
TO  11%  WHILE  U.S.  EXPORTS  ROSE  FROM 
14  TO  17%. 
THESE  DEVELOPMENTS)  IT  SEEMS  TO  MEJ 
CONSTITUTE  CRITICAL  STEPS  TOWARDS  GREATER 
PROTECTIONISM)  BECAUSE  THEY  ON  THE  ONE  HAND 
ASCRIBE  BLAME  WHERE  IT  IS  NOT  WARRANTED)  ANDJ 
ON  THE  OTHERJ  QUESTION  THE  VERY  FRAMEWORK 
WITHIN  WHICH  INTERNATIONAL  TRADE  HAS  BLOSSOMED 
OVER  THE  PAST  THIRTY  YEARSJ  AND  WHICH  HAS 
SERVED  TO  DEFUSE  PROTECTIONIST  MEASURES, 
B,  INTEREST  RATES 
~  .  ·,  ... .  ·:·  ... 
.··:  ....  . ·  .. ~. .  '.  ·.  .  .  ·.  -
MOREOVERJ  ONE  MUST  REALIZE  THAT  MUCH  ~~~~~~~~~%~~~ 
/oF  THE  TROUBLES  ,,, 
/ 
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OF  THE  TROUBLES  EXPERIENCED  BY  THE  AMERICAN  FARMERS 
ANDTHE  STEEL  AND  AUTOMOBILE  INDUSTRIES  ARE  . 
LARGELY  A RESULT  OF  THE  STRONG  DISINFLATIONARY 
' 
POLICIES  WHICH  THE  CURRENT  U.S,  ADMINISTRATION 
HAS  CHOSEN  TO  ADOPT,  HIGH  INTEREST  RATES 
LIMIT  THE  AVAILABILITY  OF  FINANCIAL  RESOURCES 
FOR  INVESTMENT  AND  FORCE  BANKRUPTCIES  IN  THE 
FARM  AND  RETAIL  SECTORS,  THE  CONCURRENT 
INCREASED  VALUE  OF  THE  DOLLAR  HAS  MADE  U.S. 
.  -.  ;"·  .·  -
GOODS  LESS  COMPETITIVE  ABROAD~·  CURBING  EXPORTS  ~~~*~~~~#;~~;~f~~~~~~~ 
OF  U.S.  INDUSTRIAL  AND  AGRICULTURAL-PRODUCTS 
AND  INCREASING  IMPORTS~  ALTHOUGH  REDUCED 
CONSUMER  DEMAND  - DUE  TO  THE  RECESSION  - IS 
ALSO  A FACTOR, 
C,  RECIPROCITY 
THE  POTENTIAL  ENACTMENT  OF  RECIPROCITY 
LEGISLATION  IN  THE  U.S.  CONGRESS~  TO  ENSURE 
"EQUAL"  ACCESS  FOR  U,S.  GOODS  TO  FOREIGN  MAR-
KETS  ALSO  ADDS  TO  THE  TRANSATLANTIC  PROTEC-
TONIST  ATMOSPHERE.  A RECENT  REPORT  SHOWS 
/THAT  THERE  ARE,,, 
m~~~~~?:~~~~tiJ~~i.t'~~? 
•.. -··.  .  : ...  ·- :~!--:  .:.: ·: -'-,. I 
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' 
THAT  THERE  ARE  14  BILLS  BEFORE  CONGRESS 
CALLING  FOR  RECIPROCITY  IN  TRADE  RELATIONS 
AND  OVER  50  BILLS  THAT  CONTAIN  SOME  ELEMENTS 
OF  PROTECTION,  ONE  MOTIVATION  BEHIND  THIS 
LEGISLATION  IS  A GENERAL  FEELING  OF  A PER- . 
CEIVED  STRENGTHENING  OF  PROTECTIONISM  IN 
WORLD  MARKETS;  ANOTHER  IS  THE  DESIRE  TO  REACT 
-AG-A-INST  JAPAN'S  SLOWNESS  IN  DISMANTLING 
NON-TARIFF  BARRIERS, 
RECIPROCITY  ON  A BILATERAL  OR  SECTORAL 
BASIS  COULD  POSE  SEVERAL  PROBLEMS  FOR  THE 
INTERNATIONAL  TRADING  SYSTEM,  IT  WOULD  UPSET 
THE  BALANCE  OF  CONCESSIONS,  CAREFULLY 
-.·-.···-,'•  '  ' 
~-~  .  . .  - .·  .  ~:  ...... 
"''.•.-'  -_:·.  . '.  ·  ..  '  ··'  .  .,_  . 
'  ', 
NEGOTIATED  IN  THE  MULTILATERAL  TRADE  NEGOTIA- -
TIONS 1  AND  BE  PERCEIVED  AS  ANOTHER  PROTEC-
TIONIST  POLICY  TOOL,  WHICH  COULD  LEAD  TO 
RETALIATORY  MEASURES  BY  TRADING  PARTNERS, 
..  ·_._ 
E.  WI 
PERHAPS  MORE  DANGEROUS  THAN  THIS 
/RHETORICAL,,, 
·-
', :.·  .  --,:·  ·.·.- .  . .  -·-.· ,. 
~~~J.~?1~;1~~f~!~~+~~~~t1~~ 
.  ~.  -:·  ~~  ... _:.,·>:··:-. 22 
RHETORICAL  AND  LEGAL  CHALLENGE  TO  EUROPEAN 
POLICIES  IS  AN  AMERICAN  PREOCCUPATION  FOR 
ALTERING  THE  ARRANGEMENTS  FOR  MONITORING 
TRADE  POLICY,  WHILE  WE  CANNOT  BUT  WELCOME 
THE  U.s.'s  USE  OF  GATT  INSTRUMENTS  TO  SEEK 
ADJUDICATION  OF  A SERIES  OF  DISPUTES  ON  BOTH 
INDUSTRIAL  AND  ~GRICULTURAL GOODS 1  WE  HOPE 
THAT  THE  U.S.  WILL  NOT  CARRY  OUT  ITS  THREAT 
TO  SEEK  A REVISION  OF  GATT  RULES 1  SHOULD  THE 
CASES  NOT  GO  ITS  WAY,  THIS  WOULD  SET  A 
DANGEROUS  PRECEDENT  FOR  OTHER  COUNTRIES 1 
THAT  IN  TURN  COULD  THEMSELVES  SEEK  RENEGO-
TIATION  OF  GATT  RULES  IF  FUTURE  CASES  WENT 
AGAINST  THEM.  AN  ADDITIONAL  DANGER  WOULD  BE 
NON-OBSERVANCE  OF  DECISIONS  TAKEN  BY  GATT 
PANELS. 
IT  IS  A MISCONCEPTION  TO  BELIEVE  THAT 
GROWING  CONFLICTS  IN  INTERNATIONAL  TRADE  CAN 
BE  MORE  EASILY  SETTLED  BY  AMENDING~  ADJUSTING~ 
OR  CREATING  NEW  RULES. 
/AS  A RECENT  GATT .. I 
-.... 
',•  ·  .. -------~-----~-----------
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.  ,,  "  - -·~ ._.  - ·.  ~;  .  '  ..  . 
~~ 
AS  'A  RECENT  GATT  REPORT  CONCLUDES: 
"WHEN  PUBLIC  POLICY  IS  USED  TO  PROTECT 
DOMESTIC  GROUPS  FACING  COMPETITION  FROM 
ABROAD~  THE  PLANS  OF  THE  FOREIGN  PRO-
DUCERS  WILL  BE  UPSET  AND  THEIR  GOVERN-
MENTS  WILL~  IN  TURN~  BE  CALLED  UPON  TO 
TO  TAKE  CORRESPONDING  MEASURES," 
FURTHERMORE~  THE  LARGE  NUMBER  OF 
CASES  BROUGHT  AG-AINST  THE  E,C  BY  U.S,  PRODUCERS 
-OF-_ -WHEAT  FLOUR~  SUGAR~  POULTRY~  PASTA~  CANNED 
::u:::O  A:~S~:T:~:A::l::T  T::L:l~::~:A~~~~::~ENT ~~~~~~> 
PROCESS  IN  THE  GATT  AND  WITH  IT  THE  LEGAL 
WORLD  TRADE  ARRANGEMENTS  - AS  ONE  EUROPEAN 
TRADE  EXPERT  STATES  IT  - "JUST  AS  CERTAINLY 
AS  OVERLOADING  WITH  TOO  MANY  BULBS  AN  ELECTRIC· 
CIRCUIT." 
'"'"t 
A KEY  ELEMENT  IN  THE  E,C,  S POSITION 
ON  INTERNATIONAL  TRADE  IS  STRICT  ADHERENCE  TO 
GATT.  WE  HAVE  ABIDED  BY  THE  RULES  OF  GATT  AND 
WILL  CONTINUE  TO  DO  SO, 
/AT  THE  SAME  TIME~  HOWEVER1••• 
- - .  .  -,~  . .  ... , . 
. § :·_.: .': :  ,, 
·-.-.  __  ...  --_:  ·i:'::_:_,.: 
,'  '  ...  ~- '.'  :  ·:  :.''·, ... 
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AT  THE  SAME  TIMEJ  HOWEVERJ  WE  MUST 
RECOGNIZE  THAT  A POTENTIAL  DANGER  EXISTS  THAT 1 
SHOULD  MANY  OF  THESE  CASES  VINDICATE  THE 
COMMUNITY  POSITION1  POLITICAL  LEADERS  WOULD 
BE  PRESSED  TO  RE-EXAMINE  THE  RULES  GOVERNING 
WORLD  TRADE, 
IT  WILL  BE  IMPORTANT  IN  THE  FUTURE 
TO  ENSURE  THAT  THE  INTERNATIONAL  INSTRUMENTAL- · 
PRUDENCE  AND  WHEN  THE  SITUATION  TRULY  WARRANTS 
IT1  RATHER  THAN  IN  REACTION  TO  UNWARRANTED 
DOMESTIC  CONCERNS, 
RECIPROCITY  LEGISLATION1  COUNTER-
VAILING  DUTY  AND  ANTI-DUMPING  CASES  AGAINST 
E,C,  STEEL  EXPORTS1  AND  THE  ATTEMPTS  TO  REVISE. 
GATT  RULES  COULD  LEAD  TO  PRESSURES  IN  EUROPE 
FOR  COUNTER-MEASURES  WHICH  GOVERNMENTS  WOULD 
FIND  DIFFICULT  TO  RESIST  IN  THOSE  TIMES  OF 
ECONOMIC  CRISIS,  BESIDESJ  REVISION  OF  GATT 
/RULES  WOULD  BE,,, 
.,...  .. 
-- . .·  . ·-
. - ~.  .  .  ~- . .  ' 
.  '- ~  . 
.  '. .  . . .  :  ~ 
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RULES  WOULD  BE  A CONTROVERSIAL  AND  LENGTHY 
PROCESS,  IT  COULD  CREATE  AN  ADDITIONAL 
ELEMENT  OF  UNCERTAINTY  IN  A VERY  UNCERTAIN 
WORLD, 
F.  JAPAN 
OUR  PROBLEM1  AS  I  ALLUDED  TO  A MOMENT 
AG01  HOWEVER1  DOES  NOT  REST  SOLELY  WITH  THE 
UNITED  STATES.  JAPANESE  IMPORT  RESTRICTIONS1 
I 
ITS  UNABATED  EXPORT  DRIVE1  ACCOMPANIED  BY  AN 
UNDERVALUED  YEN1  AND  ITS  HERMETIC  FINANCIAL 
AND  CAPITAL  MARKETS1  HAVE  CREATED  A SITUATION 
IN  WHICH  THE  E,C,  HAD  A $ 14  BILLION  DEFICIT 
WITH  JAPAN  IN  1981.  WE  HAVE  SOUGHT  CONSULTA-
TIONS  UNDER  ARTICLE  23  OF  GATT  CONCERNING 
'I 
JAPAN'S  TRADE  PRACTICES, 
JAPAN  HAS  TAKEN  STEPS  TO  LIBERALIZE 
THE  ACCESS  TO  ITS  DOMESTIC  MARKET  BY  RECENTLY 
DECIDING  TO  REMOVE  OR  LOWER  67  NON-TARIFF 
BARRIERS,  JAPAN  HAS  ALSO  INDICATED  ITS 
/WILLINGNESS  TO  II I 
'  ·-: ... 
·,  ·.  ,-,.  -. .. 
~Jf~~~~~~.?t.t4'~~~t~~~~;,. 
. . ·:·  ·. 
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WILLINGNESS  TO  ALLOW  EASIER  ACCESS  TO  ITS 
FINANCIAL  MARKETS,  SUCH  STEPS  ARE  NOTEWORTHY1 
AS  THEY  REDUCE  THE  RISK  THAT  FURTHER  RESTRIC-
TIONS  ON  JAPANESE  IMPORTS  WOULD  BE  IMPOSED. 
HOWEVER1  THEY  ONLY  CONSTITUTE  A FIRST  STEP 
IN  THE  RIGHT  DIRECTION. 
VI I.  CONCLUSION 
~ '  '  ... l .. 
A.  PRESERVING  THE  GATT  SYSTEM 
IN  SPITE  OF  MANY  PRESSURES  -AND 
DIFFICULTIES1  THE  WESTERN  NATIONS  HAVE  BEEN 
ABLE  TO  RESIST  EXTREME  FORMS  OF  PROTECTIONISM 
THUS  FAR. 
THE  MULTILATERAL  TRADE  NEGOTIATIONS1 
PARTICULARLY  THE  TOKYO  ROUND 1  HAVE  BEEN  A 
MAJOR  FACTOR  IN  COMBATTING  PROTECTIONIST 
TENDENCIES, 
.::- .  .-.~ ..  ;;., •  .._,_: ....  _;-I-·-·.-.....  """·,·-· ... ~~  ....... 
~~ 
.  ~ .  ·;  .  .  ;  .  :,  .  /  " . .....  - .  .  ..  ~-..  -., 
. .  . .  . 
.-·-· 
~-~:_;.,<~~~~'~;:·,·-,,"~;'~:.;~~-,;-,~~~~~  ..... 
.·.•  ... -. 
·.-_  :~ _ ... 
·.  · ... ·._  -. 
..  ~ ' 
A SET  OF  RULES  IN  THE  GATT1  PAINFULLY  ~~~~~~-~!~~~ 
/NEGOTIATED  AND  II I 
· ..  '  .·.  -: ...  ·· 
':- . -.. 
.  .  . .  . 
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NEGOTIATED  AND  AGREED  TOJ  GOVERN  OUR  TRADING  .·  :.  :._. . .  -·.  :  .. :.·=:. :"'  ,·  ... 
RELATIONSHIP,  LARGELY  BECAUSE  OF  THOSE  RULES  ·  · 
AND  PROCEDURESJ  WE  HAVE  BEEN  REMARKABLY  SUC-
CESSFUL  IN  PREVENTING  THE  ERUPTION  OF  TOTAL 
CHAOS  IN  THE  INTERNATIONAL  TRADING  SYSTEM, 
AFTER  V~RSAILLESJ  THE  GATT  MINISTERIAL 
IN  NOVEMBER  WILL  AFFORD  AN  OPPORTUNITY  TO 
RE-ASSESS  OUR  TRADE  RELATIONS  IN  GREATER 
DEPTH,  THE  COMMUNITY  WELCOMES  ANY  OCCASION 
TO  DISCUSS  MUTUAL  PROBLEMS  AND  TO  CONSULT 
WITH  OUR  TRADING  PARTNERS  ON  HOW  BEST  TO 
DEAL  WITH  GROWING  PROTECTIONIST  PRESSURES, 
THE  E.C.  DOES  NOT  WISH  TO  PURSUE  AGGRESSIVE 
TRADE  POLICIES  AND  WELCOMES  THE  EXPANSION 
AND  REINFORCEMENT  OF  THE  CONSULTATION  PROCESS 
AMONG  CONCERNED  PARTIESJ  BE  THEY  THE  -INFORMAL 
MEETINGS  ON  TRADEJ  THE  BI-ANNUAL  U,S,-E,C. 
HIGH-LEVEL  CONSULTATIONSJ  OR  CONSULTATIONS 
WITHIN  THE  CONTEXT  OF  THE  OECD  AND  GATT. 
/JuDICious  usE  OF  GATT  PROCEDURES, .. 
. :  ... ·  -.-. 
'.·  -~- ~  .. : .  :  . 
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JUDICIOUS  USE  OF  GATT  PROCEDURES  WILL 
ENSURE  THEIR  CONTINUING  STRENGTH  AND  UTILITY, 
DAMPENING  RHETORICAL  EXCHANGE  ACROSS  THE 
ATLANTIC  WILL  CREATE  A BETTER  ATMOSPHERE  FOR 
SOLVING  PROBLEMS  AND  ACHIEVING  SOLUTIONS  TO 
TRADE  DISPUTES, 
THE  MECHANISMS  ARE  NOT  PERFECT,  THEY 
CONSTITUTE1  IN  A SENSE1  "DAMAGE-CONTROL." 
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SURES  TO  RESORT  TO  MISGUIDED  POLICIES,  GREATER 
BARRIERS  IN  TRADE  IN  TIMES  OF  ECONOMIC  DOWN-
TURN  WOULD  ONLY  FURTHER  ARREST  THE  RETURN  TO 
ECONOMIC  GROWTH  AND  PROSPERITY,  AS  ENERGY 
PRICES  STABILIZE  AND  AS  THE  TRADING  NATIONS 
OF  THE  WORLD  SLOWLY  ADJUST  TO  CHANGES  IN  THE 
PATTERN  OF  TRADE  AMONG  THEM1  THE  WORLD  ECONOMY 
CAN  RECOVER  FROM  ITS  LATEST  CONJUNCTURAL 
CRISIS, 
AS  THIS  "DAMAGE-CONTROL"  OPERATION 
/HAS  BEEN  I  I  I 
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HAS  BEEN  SUCCESSFULJ  SO  NOW  MUST  WE  COMMIT 
OURSELVES  FOR  THE  FUTURE  TO  WHAT  CAN  BE  DONE 
IN  A POSITIVE  WAY  TO  RESIST  PROTECTIONISM 
AND  PROMOTE  INTERNATIONAL  TRADE. 
WE  NEED  TO  MAKE  PROGRESS  IN  THE  FIELD 
OF  SERVICES  AND  JNVESTMENT,  FOR  THE  FIRST 
TIMEJ  WE  WILL  BE  CONSIDERING  THIS  ISSUE  IN 
THE  CONTEXT  OF  GATT. 
WE  MUST  SEEK  TO  INVEST  AND  COLLABORATE 
FURTHER  IN  RESEARCH  AND  DEVELOPMENT  IN  ORDER 
TO  IMPROVE  OLD  TECHNOLOGIES  AND  DEVISE  NEW 
ONESj  PARTICULARLY  IN  THE  FIELDS  OF  ENERGY 
AND  TELECOMMUNICATIONS, 
GENERALLYJ  WE  MUST  CREATE  THE  CONDI-
TIONS  IN  OUR  RESPECTIVE  HOME  MARKETS  WHICH 
WILL  ENSURE  THE  EXPANSION  OF  TRADE  AND  J  IN 
,, 
CONJUNCTION  WITH  ITJ  ECONOMIC  GROWTH, 
/BUT  THESE  IDEAS  I  II 
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BUT  THESE  IDEAS  ARE  FERTILE  GROUND 
FOR  ANOTHER  SPEECH  - OR  PERHAPS  ANOTHER 
CONFERENCE. 
WHAT  IS  IMPORTANT  TO  RECOGNIZE  TODAY 
IS  THAT~  JUST  AS  WE  HAVE  BEEN  SUCCESSFUL  IN 
USING  THE  LEGAL  .INTERNATIONAL  INSTRUMENTS  AT 
OUR  DISPOSAL  TO  DETER  TRADE  WARS  AND  OTHER 
ECONOMIC  ALTERCATIONS~  WE  NEED  TO  MARSHAL 
THE  RESOURCES  - INTELLECTUAL,  SOCIAL~  AND 
ECONOMIC  -NECESSARY  TO  RETURN  TO  THE  PROSPERI-
TY  WHICH  HAS  BEEN  ONE  OF  THE  WESTERN  WORLD'S 
HALLMARK  ACHIEVEMENTS  AND  A FOUNDATION  OF 
PEACE  FOR  OVER  A GENERATION, 
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